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Abstract Women are over-represented within alter-
native medicine, both as consumers and as service
providers. In this paper, I show that the appeal of
alternative medicine to women relates to the neglect
of women’s health needs within scientific medicine.
This is concerning because alternative medicine is
severely limited in its therapeutic effects; therefore,
those who choose alternative therapies are liable to
experience inadequate healthcare. I argue that while
many patients seek greater autonomy in alternative
medicine, the absence of an evidence base and plau-
sible mechanisms of action leaves patients unable to
realize meaningful autonomy. This seems morally
troubling, especially given that the neglect of
women’s needs within scientific medicine seems to
contribute to preferences for alternative medicine. I
conclude that the liberatory credentials of alternative
medicine should be questioned and make recom-
mendations to render scientific medicine better able
to meet the needs of typical alternative medicine
consumers.
Keywords Alternativemedicine .Women’s health .
Autonomy. Informed consent . Feminism
Introduction
Women dominate alternative medicine (AM), both as
consumers (Sharma 1992, 19–20; Ernst and White
2000; Cherkin et al. 2002; Tindle et al. 2005; Verhoef
et al. 2005; Eardley et al. 2012) and as service providers
(Cant and Sharma 2004; Nissen 2010; Nissen 2011;
Keshet and Simchai 2014). In this paper I analyse the
gender differential in AM consumption and provision
against the context of two facts. First, AM use is driven
by (a) dissatisfaction with scientific medicine (SM)
(McIntosh and Ogunbanjo 2008), (b) the favouring of a
more equitable patient–provider dynamic which centres
patient autonomy (Gollschewski et al. 2008; Hall et al.
2012), (c) its association with particular ideologies, no-
tably feminism (Astin 1998; Scott 1998). Second, SM
does not adequately serve women’s health needs, which
are often under-researched (e.g., Mikhail 2005;
Holdcroft 2007) and under-treated (Annandale and
Hunt 2000; Hoffmann and Tarzian 2001), while
women’s bodies are over-medicalized (e.g., Drew
2003; Leidy Sievert 2003). I argue that we should com-
bine these facts and take seriously the idea that women’s
attraction to AM is related to the fact that SM neglects
women’s needs. This has moral consequences, since AM
therapies have a weak or absent evidence base and do not
have plausible, verifiable mechanisms, which leavesAM
patients under-served, vulnerable to exploitation, and
unable to realize meaningful patient autonomy.
This article is structured as follows. In section 2, I
explore the claim that SM neglects the needs of women.
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its use. In section 4, I describe the typical profile of an
AM user and review some common reasons for prefer-
ring alternative therapies. In section 5, I argue that
despite being chosen in reaction to the shortcomings of
SM, AM cannot offer greater patient autonomy and is
perhaps more liable to be exploitative. In section 6, I
conclude that SM should be reformed to better meet the
needs of women and other marginalized groups and
recommend that medical professionals prioritize longer
consultations for those with long-term and/or unre-
solved health issues.
How Medicine Underserves Women
Scientific medicine has a chequered history, particularly
in relation to its treatment of women and people of
colour in the contexts of theory, research participation,
and clinical consultation. Like other forms of science,
medicine is value-laden. Its social power renders it
prone to reflect the mores of any given era, including
the moral failings. Accordingly, certain medical ad-
vances may have occurred because of the ethical short-
comings of medical practice and research, rather than in
spite of them. For example, experimentation on
enslaved women in the nineteenth century (Ojanuga
1993), including surgery without anaesthetic, led to
important discoveries which ground modern gynaecol-
ogy. Had this experimentation been deferred until
consenting subjects were available—presumably when
safe, reliable general anaesthetics were accessible many
decades later (Robinson and Toledo 2012)—the prog-
ress of gynaecology would have been delayed. This and
other abuses of people of colour in medical experimen-
tation have led to reduced trust in physicians (Randall
1995; Boulware et al. 2016) and medical research
(Rajakumar et al. 2009) within communities of colour.
That the exploitation of certain groups has been critical
to medical progress raises questions about who has been
centred, and who side-lined, in the development of
modern SM.
Women’s confidence in SM continues to be tested, as
medicine is often inadequate in meeting the differential
needs of female bodies and women patients. Women are
still often perceived as Breproductive beings^(Langer
and Fleck 2013), which leads to non-reproductive health
problems being under-researched and under-diagnosed
(see, e.g., Mikhail 2005), while reproduction is over-
medicalized (Cahill 2001). For example, while there
have been significant advances in artificial reproductive
technologies, non-reproductive health issues that are
important to women’s well-being or pleasure, such as
menopause (Posner 1979; Cordingley et al. 2009) and
female orgasm (Tuana 2004), remain under-researched.
Female participants have long been excluded as re-
search subjects (Holdcroft 2007; Liu and Mager 2016),
leading to lacunae in specificities of disease in females.
Health conditions which affect both sexes can manifest
in particular ways in female patients (e.g., anaemia,
osteoporosis, cardiovascular disease), rendering stan-
dard treatments suboptimal or unsafe (Gronowski and
Schindler 2014). Likewise, pharmaceuticals whose safe-
ty and efficacy are inferred from studies onmale patients
are sometimes unsafe and/or ineffective for female pa-
tients (Bies et al. 2003; Regitz-Zagrosek 2012).
Gendered inequalities in healthcare are also widely
reported in clinical encounters, as physicians make as-
sumptions about women’s health based on gender ste-
reotypes about pain thresholds and patient credibility,
while drawing on male-centred research and guidelines
(van Wijk et al. 1996; Annandale and Hunt 2000).
Women’s pain reports are often discredited or their pain
inappropriately attributed to mental health issues
(Hoffmann and Tarzian 2001). Women admitted to hos-
pitals in the United States are 13 to 25 per cent less likely
than men to receive opioid analgesia for abdominal pain
even given the same pain score, wait longer than men to
receive any pain medication at all (Chen et al. 2008),
and are less likely to receive appropriate treatment for
myocardial infarction, leading to a higher mortality rate
(Pelletier et al. 2014). These disparities have also been
established in relation to race: Black patients are less
likely to receive treatments for myocardial infarction
than white patients, with Black women faring worst of
all, with the highest resultant mortality rate (Vaccarino
et al. 2005). Likewise, women with septic shock are
more likely to die in hospital than men (Pietropaoli
et al. 2010), and critically ill women over the age of
fifty are less likely than men to be admitted to intensive
care units and receive life-saving treatments, again lead-
ing to a higher mortality rate (Bierman 2007).
In general, women’s health issues are liable to be
attributed to psychological or emotional, rather than
physical, causes. A study investigating gendered differ-
ences in the treatment of irritable bowel syndrome found
that female patients were more likely to be offered seda-
tives and lifestyle advice, while male patients were more
frequently offered X-ray imaging of the colon (Hamberg
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et al. 2004). Women are also more likely to have negative
experiences with healthcare providers, including not be-
ing believed, not being listened to, and feeling they are
treated disrespectfully (Upmark et al. 2007).
It is telling that medically unexplained disorders
are more common in women (Nimnuan et al. 2001).
Their resolution may be thwarted by the disempow-
erment women patients experience within consulta-
tions, leading to a suboptimal assessment of their
symptoms (Malterud 2000). Iatrogenic harms
through unnecessary investigations are a common
outcome (Page and Wessely 2003). Recent research
suggests that doctors’ failure to understand medically
unexplained symptoms may relate to medicine’s in-
ability to accommodate physical abnormalities whose
origins lie in the social stressors associated with
being a woman (Herrman 2017). Others understand
medically unexplained disorders to be the contempo-
rary version of Bhysteria,^ a trivializing catch-all for
the underfunded, under-researched health conditions
which affect women (Jutel 2014).
Medicine, as a site of social power, reflects the con-
tours of power in society at large, and patriarchal values
are prevalent in healthcare provision as a structural trend
which is also mediated through injustices within individ-
ual encounters (Govender and Penn-Kekana 2008).
Women’s health testimony is deemed to be less credible,
knowledge about both women’s health issues and the
specificities of disease in females are inadequate, and
women receive inadequate treatment for a range of health
problems, leading to higher morbidity and mortality. In
the next section I suggest that it may be partly in light of
the sluggish pace of change of patriarchal values within
medicine that women are over-represented amongst those
seeking therapies outside the biomedical paradigm, in
search of healthcare that avoids these negative associa-
tions and which places greater emphasis on patient au-
tonomywithin an equitable patient–provider relationship.
Defining Alternative Medicine
There are few satisfactory definitions of AM. It is often
confused, conflated, or conjugated with complementary
medicine, defined operationally (Wieland et al. 2011) as
a disparate conjunction of practices, or distinguished
from SM only through contrast to it.
First of all , I will redefine and set aside
Bcomplementary medicine^ in an attempt to simplify
an opaque set of uses. I take the term at face value:
Bcomplementary^ medicine will here refer to therapies
that are not exclusive to the medical domain but are
nonetheless often endorsed by medical practitioners,
since they are complementary to, which is to say facil-
itative of, good health. Complementary medicine there-
fore comprises all therapies or heuristics which comple-
ment SM but do not attempt to replace it. These are
therapies which may be related to one’s lifestyle or
obtained through one’s social relations: a healthy diet,
exercise, massage, relaxation techniques, group or indi-
vidual counselling. In other words, complementary
medicine tends to involve engagement with determi-
nants of health problems, rather than health problems
themselves. These interventions generally have an evi-
dence base, even though their effects are often incre-
mental and long-term. For example, massage therapy
has been shown to reduce pain, anxiety, and blood
pressure (Moyer et al. 2004), while the breathing tech-
niques used in yoga have also been shown to reduce
blood pressure (Grossman et al. 2001). Complementary
therapies do not generally require medical supervision
or facilitation, yet their benefits may be straightforward-
ly rationalized in line with SM, albeit generally in indi-
rect terms.
AM, on the other hand, departs dramatically from the
paradigms of science. AM is used as a replacement for
SM, in part or in whole; that is, it sets out to treat
ailments that would generally be considered to be med-
ical in nature. Drawing on recent work by Shahvisi
(2016), AM1 may be defined as intended treatment that:
1. Does not have any proven effect beyond placebo, and;
2. Either:
(a) does not posit any mechanism;
(b) posits a physical mechanism that is implausible
with respect to known science;
1 Hereafter, I will only refer to alternative medicine, as defined here, as
this is the target of my analysis. This presents an apparent methodo-
logical difficulty, since the literature upon which I draw does not use a
consistent definition of alternative medicine. Very often, studies coa-
lesce complementary and alternative medicine into the same term (as
BCAM^), or, where definitions of either are attempted, there is vari-
ability, and none quite matches my own. In practice, this doesn’t
present a serious difficulty, since it is standard for each paper to also
offer an operational definition (by listing treatments of interest), from
which one can confirm that the therapies in question are (largely or
solely) those which in any case qualify as alternative medicine accord-
ing to my definition, even if many of them use the looser and more
customary Bcomplementary and alternative medicine^ label.
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(c) posits a mechanism that is not physical.
SM therapies elude this categorization on two fronts:
as a general rule, they have been proven to be effective
beyond placebo and their mechanisms are known and
are consistent with the remainder of our science. There
are some exceptions and caveats to this claim, which
must be spelled out in order to defend against a possible
objection. For some SM therapies, such as aspirin and
cancer chemotherapy (Shahvisi 2016) there is no firm
consensus as to the mechanism. Yet it is important to
note that this is a matter of over-determination; the lack
of consensus derives from the fact that these therapies
have multiple likely mechanisms, all of which are con-
sistent with accepted science. It is just not yet clear
which of these is the most determinative of the observed
therapeutic effect. There is every reason to believe that
the matter will be settled in due course, and no expecta-
tion that the ultimate mechanism will be anti-scientific.
Regardless, almost all of these therapies have been
shown to be effective beyond placebo. This is not to
deny that the evidence for common SM therapies can be
a complicated matter: some therapies enter general us-
age without a robust evidence base (albeit exceeding
placebo) (e.g. Davis et al. 2017), while therapies ema-
nating from highly cited studies sometimes continue to
be used and promoted even after they have been
contradicted (Tatsioni, Bonitsis, and Ioannidis 2007).
Whilst SM is regulated and particular evidential stan-
dards are supposed to be met, the reality is less than
perfect (Epstein 2017). Further, while SM therapies are
effective beyond placebo, the heavy reliance on placebo
within medicine must be acknowledged. Not only do
many doctors regularly knowingly prescribe placebos in
order to appease patients whose problems are not seri-
ous or not easily treatable (Tilburt et al. 2008; Howick
et al. 2013), but placebo is an important part of per-
ceived symptom relief for SM therapies (Kaptchuk and
Miller 2015).
Homeopathy is perhaps the most famed variant of
AM and serves as an expository archetype. Its ostensible
mechanism of action is elaborate and internally consis-
tent. It imbues water with a Bmemory^ which outlasts
multiple dilutions of an infinitesimal amount of active
ingredient. However, not only does this mechanism fail
to cohere with the remainder of our vast scientific
knowledge but its claims are directly contradicted by
that body of knowledge. All of our accepted science tells
us that water does not have a memory, which means that
the tiny amounts of active ingredient in the original
solution could not leave a trace in the eventual product,
from which the active ingredient is itself absent. Ho-
meopathic pills are therefore just sugar pills, and their
efficacy is capped at the nominal placebo effect which
applies to all treatments (Ernst 2002; Nuhn et al. 2010).
Consider also chiropractic, which claims that a range
of health conditions can be treated throughmanipulation
of the spine. Whilst the details of the proposed underly-
ing mechanisms vary, the central claim of chiropractic is
that misalignments or displacement of the vertebrae,
known as Bsubluxations^ (which are not necessarily
detectable using medical imaging, e.g., X-rays (WHO
2005)), affect the nervous system in such a way as to
bring about a range of health conditions, including
musculoskeletal pain, headache, asthma, and gastroin-
testinal problems (Posadzki and Ernst 2011). Chiroprac-
tors manually manipulate the spine in ways that are
alleged to rectify the subluxations and thereby remedy
the associated health conditions. There is no evidence
for the existence of chiropractic subluxations (Homola
2010), no scientifically acceptable mechanism for the
way in which subluxations cause ill health (Mirtz et al.
2009), and no scientific evidence for the efficacy of
chiropractic for the treatment of any medical issue
(Posadzki and Ernst 2011).
Likewise, other AM modalities are ineffective be-
yond placebo and lack mechanisms that are consistent
with the remainder of our science, for example, energy
medicine (Stenger 1999; Ernst 2006), naturopathic med-
icine (Atwood 2003), and faith healing (American
Cancer Society 2013). Importantly, what all these ther-
apies have in common is the absence of a plausible
mechanism, that is, one that fits in with the remainder
of our collective knowledge and can therefore be veri-
fied. As such, their method of action or the reason for
their selection cannot be explained to patients, because
there is no objective sense in which these facts are
knowable by the practitioner, let alone the patient
(Shahvisi 2016). The consequences of this difficulty will
be returned to in section 5.
Alternative Medicine as Liberatory?
Drawing on studies across populations in Global North
contexts (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Germa-
ny, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United King-
dom, and the United States), the profile of a typical AM
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user is a woman (MacLennan et al. 1996; Verheij et al.
1999; Ernst and White 2000; Stein et al. 2009; Frass
et al. 2012) who is more highly educated (MacLennan
et al. 1996; Blais et al. 1997; Verheij et al. 1999; Ernst
and White 2000; Stein et al. 2009; Frass et al. 2012),
relatively affluent2 (Blais et al. 1997; Ernst and White
2000; Stein et al. 2009), and often suffering from a long-
term health condition (Blais et al. 1997; Busato et al.
2005; Stein et al. 2009; Ernst 2010; Frass et al. 2012).
Empirical research reveals a range of motivations for
AM use. Unsurprisingly, users believe that AM is effec-
tive in alleviating medical problems (Ernst and White
2000). Amongst other positive motivations, or Bpull
factors,^ are the presumed Bnaturalness^ of AM
treatments—the belief that they are Borganic,^ Bpure,^
and Bsafe^ (Ernst 2010)—the control they are believed
to offer over illness/health (Stein et al. 2009), and the
contention that they are person-centred and holistic
(Ernst 2010). Negative factors, or Bpush factors,^ also
abound: dissatisfaction with SM and the doctor–patient
relationship or the clinical encounter (Moore et al. 1985;
Mitzdorf et al. 1999; Stein et al. 2009; Ernst 2010) and
doubts about the efficacy of treatments within SM
(MacLennan et al. 1996; Stein et al. 2009). While many
scholars (Furnham and Smith 1988; Joy 2004;McIntosh
and Ogunbanjo 2008) conclude that disenchantment
with SM is a more determinative indicator for AM use
than belief in the efficacy of AM, others (e.g., Astin
1998) determine that a commitment to feminism, envi-
ronmentalism, or another value-system is most pertinent
to AM use. Indeed, various theories have been proposed
and tested as to the ideological reasons why people
choose AM (Bakx 1991; Astin 1998; Siahpush 1998),
which include a desire for greater autonomy, a desire to
reduce the power differential between patient and prac-
titioner, and an attempt to access therapies which better
fit the patient’s personal philosophy or value system.
Importantly, AM use is associated with greater num-
bers of encounters with general practitioners and nega-
tive associations with SM as a result of iatrogenic effects
of long-term medication (Murray and Shepherd 1993;
Al-Windi 2004). Further, the relatively high level of
education and income amongst service-users indicates
that AM is likely to be a considered decision amid
multiple options, rather than a last resort. This suggests
that patients are preferentially seeking AMwhere SM is
accessible, so that even though some of the listed moti-
vations appear to be affirmative of the therapeutic value
or ideology of AM, these may also be construed as a
tacit critique of SM.
In an empirical study, Siahpush (1998) finds that
patients Bturn away from orthodoxy not because of its
failure to deliver the promise of good health, but be-
cause of the way they are treated by doctors.^ By
contrast, AM is often interpreted as offering a Bdifferent
conception of social reality and social relations^ (Cooter
1988). For many practitioners and users, AM use is a
way of expressing resistance to the dominant biomedical
paradigm, within which doctors are charged with
entrenching the patriarchy of the profession by control-
ling the information that is legitimate within a medical
interaction in ways that uphold their authority (Fisher
1993; Thompson 2003).
Importantly, it has been shown that homeopaths in
the United States spend twice as long with patients as
their doctors do (Jacobs et al. 1998). AM is seen as
being more personalized, and to its users it stands in
contrast to SM in that it Bdoes not marginalize or deny
human experience; rather, it affirms patients’ real-life
worlds^ (Kaptchuk and Eisenberg 1998, 1062). Some
AM users do not reject SM but rather welcome an
opportunity to assume control and autonomy as part of
a regime of self-care during chronic illness that is not
deemed to be possible within the paradigms of SM
(Thorne et al. 2002).
AM is thought to overcome the ontological dualism
and one-size-fits-all model that typifies SM. Many AM
modalities (e.g. homeopathy) claim to generate thera-
pies in response to the particular needs of an individual
patient (Scott 1998). This is deemed to be preferable to
the universalism of science, largely because it is
intended to optimize the autonomy of the patient. Like-
wise, midwives using AM in the treatment of childbear-
ing women cite the way in which AM therapies permit
greater autonomy for themselves and their patients,
which may be a particular reaction to the medicalization
of childbirth (Hall et al. 2012).
The preponderance of women clients is only half of
the story: AM is also dominated by women practitioners
(Andrews et al. 2003; Cant and Sharma 2004; Nissen
2010; Nissen 2011; Keshet and Simchai 2014). In 1998,
women students made up 90 per cent of homeopathy
2 It is important to note that while wealthier people are the primary
users of AM in Western contexts, elsewhere this trend is reversed. In
India and Nepal, poorer, less empowered groups tend to be the primary
clients of AM practitioners, since AM is a cheaper, less technologized
sector, which is therefore more accessible to those with fewer resources
(e.g., women, older people) (Broom et al. 2009; Cameron 2010).
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classes in the United Kingdom, while almost 80 per cent
of those on the U.K. Society of Homeopaths Register
were women (Morrell 2007). At the time of writing,
women constitute 87 per cent of those registered with
the Society of Homeopaths,3 81 per cent of those regis-
tered with the U.K. Complementary and Natural
Healthcare Council, 4 which regulates a range of forms
of AM, 5 and 58 per cent of those registered on the
General Council and Register of Naturopaths.6 It has
been noted that the gender disparity is not so striking
for mechanical, more Bscientific,^modalities of AM such
as osteopathy and chiropractic, which generally require
full-time training that may deter women with other com-
mitments (Nissen 2011). Indeed, 50 per cent of those
registered with the General Osteopathic Council are
women (General Osteopathic Council 2018). (Consider
that 54 per cent of doctors in the United Kingdom are
men [General Medical Council 2018]). Further, there is
evidence of a gendered difference in attitude towards AM
amongst medical students across different contexts, with
women students more likely to view alternative therapies
positively (Furnham and McGill 2003; Lie and Boker
2004; Greenfield et al. 2006; Akan et al. 2012).
Women’s dominance as users and service-
providers within AM can be contextualized within a
broader trend of women’s greater interest in spiritu-
ality and the holistic milieu (Houtman and Aupers
2008). In the United Kingdom, women’s production
and use of holistic products and services is four times
that of men (Heelas and Woodhead 2005). AM care is
often assumed to offer attributes that are commonly
identified with normative femininity, that is, being
caring, being gentle, having strong communication
skills, taking emotions seriously, and seeking to care
for rather than cure (Shuval and Gross 2008, 51;
Keshet and Simchai 2014, 81). The holistic approach
typified by many AM modalities is theorized to be
attractive to women because it is coherent with, and
legitimizes, the relationality that women are social-
ized to embody in their care-giving but at the same
time validates notions of self-care which subvert the
stereotypical care role and recognize the importance
of a woman Bthinking about her own well-being
rather than that of her dependents^ (Sointu and
Woodhead 2008).
There is evidence that feminist values are important
within AM, for both users and practitioners. Twelve of
thirteen U.K. homeopaths interviewed by Scott (1998)
described themselves as feminists, and most of the prac-
titioners had at some point engaged in activism around
social justice issues and were in part driven by an active
interest in health politics. Scott notes that Bfeminist health
activists have argued that orthodox biomedicine imposes
passivity, ignorance, and powerlessness on patients, and
particularly on female and non-white patients^ (Scott
1998, 195). Three themes are identified as being central
to the attraction of Bfeminist homeopathy^: the power
differential in SM, the failure of biomedicine to consider
social/contextual concerns, and the trivialization of
women’s knowledge and concerns in SM encounters
(Scott 1998, 197). Likewise, Shuval and Gross (2008)
found that midwives practicing AM in the delivery room
justify this choice through aspects of feminist ideology,
notably the empowerment of women patients and the
rejection of the medicalization of childbirth.
Empowerment and autonomy are repetitive themes
in the literature onwomen’s engagement with AM. In an
Australian study of menopausal women, empowerment
emerged as the central motivator for choosing AM
therapies, with women seeking greater control in rela-
tion to their symptoms and the treatment choice, and a
desire for better information (Gollschewski et al. 2008).
Study participants described themselves as Binformation
seekers^ and sought a Bbetter understanding of the
changing needs of their bodies, the symptoms they were
experiencing, and the therapies available to them^
(Gollschewski et al. 2008, 166). They did not feel that
their general practitioners were able to provide this and
found the patient-doctor relationship asymmetric, with
their own experiences often dismissed or trivialized.
3 Pamela Stevens, Marketing Manager of the Society of Homeopaths
(pers. comm. May 17, 2018).
4 Margaret Coats, Chief Executive and Registrar of the Complemen-
tary and Natural Healthcare Council (pers. comm. May 17, 2018).
5 Despite its name, the therapies regulated by the Complementary and
Natural Healthcare Council are almost entirely those defined as alter-
native medicine in section 3 of this article. I list each of them here,
along with a reference which demonstrates the paucity or absence of
scientific evidence for the efficacy of the therapy: Alexander technique
(Baggoley 2015; NHS Choices 2015), aromatherapy (Baggoley 2015),
Bowen therapy (Baggoley 2015), colon hydrotherapy (American
Cancer Society 2015), craniosacral therapy (Atwood 2004; Hartman
2006), hypnotherapy (Flammer and Bongartz 2003), acupuncture
(Ernst 2009a; Colquhoun and Novella 2013), naturopathy (Atwood
2003), reflexology (Ernst 2009b), reiki (Lee et al. 2008), shiatsu
(Robinson et al. 2011). In addition to these, the following evidence-
based complementary therapies are also regulated by the same body:
nutritional therapy, sports therapy, massage therapy, and yoga therapy.
6 Lisa Smith, General Council and Register of Naturopaths Registrar
and Secretary (pers. comm. May 18, 2018).
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Keshet and Simchai discuss the way in which AM
treatments are valued amongst users for the way in
which they flatten the power imbalance between practi-
tioner and patient, permitting the patient to avoid patri-
archal dynamics within SM and instead feel like an
authoritative, active partner in the exchange (2014, 82).
In short, AM is valued both for pragmatic medical
reasons—because it is believed to be effective, it is
assumed to have few or no side effects, it is deemed to
be more Bnatural^—and for ideological reasons—
because it is believed to offer control over health, be
non-authoritarian, and improve patient autonomy by
avoiding paternalism and universalism. It is easy to see
why AM may be an attractive possibility for women
whose health needs are not met by SM. In the next
section, I will show that the presumed virtues of AM
are, for the most part, not supportable, and the resulting
liberatory credentials are undeserved. This is largely
because the therapies that fall within AM have never
been proven to be effective beyond placebo. But much
more worryingly, I will show that patients cannot give
informed consent to therapies whose mechanisms can-
not be explained to them in good faith.
Alternative Medicine as Paternalistic
Perhaps the most famous feminist health tome is Our
Bodies,Ourselves, whose 1978 edition proposed twenty
rights which hospital patients ought to be able to claim
(Boston Women’s Health Book Collective 1978). Half
of them pertain to a patient’s right to be fully informed
regarding both the condition that is being treated and the
treatment that is being offered. This is reflective of the
importance of autonomy to women’s health interactions.
Feminists have been critical of the centrality of au-
tonomy to philosophical conceptions of personhood,
since in its standard form it is deemed to be contrary
both to the interests of women, whose lives are strongly
characterized by relationality, and to the interests of
society as a whole, where relationality should be ac-
knowledged and valued (e.g. Jaggar 1983). Autonomy-
focused descriptions of personhood tend to idealize
atomistic, self-sufficient agents, which is judged to be
both descriptively false and normatively problematic
with respect to social beings. More recently, autonomy
has been recuperated by feminists, as it has been recog-
nized as a critical apparatus for understanding the way in
which patriarchal structures tend to over-rule and
undermine women’s autonomy (Stoljar 2013). Recuper-
ated versions are often more accurately described as
Brelational autonomy,^ where due regard is paid to
relationships with others and the effect of external lim-
iting factors, such as distributions of power (Mackenzie
and Stoljar 2000; Narayan 2002; Ells 2003).
Autonomy is particularly important to feminist
thought in the domain of healthcare, because demanding
autonomy is the most obvious and direct way of
avoiding paternalism. Paternalism occurs when the au-
tonomy of a competent person is overridden on the
grounds that an action is intended to improve their
well-being. The risk of paternalism in healthcare is
significant because of the power dynamic between a
person in need of treatment and a person who is able
to offer treatment within an establishment that is con-
sidered to be authoritative (Goodyear-Smith and
Buetow 2001).
Within medical settings, healthcare professionals en-
deavour to avoid paternalism by securing informed con-
sent from all patients before issuing any treatment. In the
ideal case, informed consent is obtained by providing
the details of the treatment options to the patient in such
a way as to ensure that she is able to understand the
reason for a particular treatment being recommended
and is then invited to approve that treatment choice
(Shahvisi 2016). In other words, the patient ought to
leave the consultation understanding why she has been
given antihistamines rather than antibiotics (say), as the
endpoint of a transparent, collaborative reasoning pro-
cess between doctor and patient. In practice, this ideal is
rarely met, since, amongst other limitations, health pro-
fessionals are subject to time constraints, patients’ sci-
entific knowledge is usually limited, and many patients
trust the medical establishment and accordingly shortcut
the process by deferring to their doctor’s authority (see
e.g. O’Neill 2003). Whilst these limitations are
concerning, it is important to note that ideal informed
consent is not an impossibility in these contexts.
By contrast, AM therapies cannot deliver on the
demand for ideal informed consent, and this limitation
is a matter of principle, not practice. It seems that AM is
therefore necessarily paternalistic. The inescapability of
this paternalism operates in two independent ways.
First, no scientifically acceptable explanation can be
given for the mechanism of the therapy, which means
that exemplary informed consent is ruled out. Second,
should toomuch information be given about the therapy,
its nominal positive effect—which relies on the placebo
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effect, which in turn relies on belief that a therapy is
efficacious—may be threatened.
In other words, AM practitioners necessarily can-
not obtain genuine informed consent from their pa-
tients in the way that SM practitioners aspire to. AM
therapies cannot be recommended to patients by ref-
erence to their mechanisms without asking patients to
accept explanations which are not consistent with the
vast body of knowledge we collectively accept. Nor
can they be recommended on the strength of their
evidence base, since none has been shown to be
effective beyond placebo.
To approach this argument another way, consider
O’Neill’s suggestion that genuine informed consent re-
quires that a patient is Bneither coerced nor deceived,
and can judge that they are not coerced or deceived,^
and that patients are offered Bextendable information,^
which is to say, Beasy access to more specific informa-
tion that lies behind an initial, or second, or third layer of
information provided^ (2003, 6). Two points must be
made. First, I am not claiming that AM practitioners
deceive their patients, deliberately or otherwise, though
that may sometimes be the case. Rather, I am suggesting
that they do not meet O’Neill’s requirement that they
could, in principle, be exposed as deceitful. Consider
that wemake judgements of whether or not we are being
deceived by assessing the likely truth of a given propo-
sition. Assessments of truth are made by reference to a
set of auxiliary assumptions regarding what we already
believe to be true in the world, and consistency with
those auxiliary beliefs is key to assessing the truth value
of a new proposition. Yet the claims made within AM
are not consistent with our most basic auxiliary assump-
tions about the world. (Note that even a person who
rejects, or claims to reject, scientific knowledge, still
draws liberally on scientific knowledge in their every-
day life; scientific knowledge underwrites all our bodily
decisions as physical beings.) It is therefore not possible
for patients to verify their likely truth unless they already
hold the proposition Bthis practitioner’s treatments will
work^ within their set of auxiliary assumptions, in
which case limitless deceit is possible. Second, extend-
able information is not possible for AM, precisely be-
cause it is not founded on the scientific principles which
guarantee an extendable information base for all other
medical queries. If someone enters into a regress of
why-questions regarding the choice to prescribe meth-
ylphenidate for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,
there will be detailed answers available all the way
down to the atomic level. Not so if a patient wishes to
understand why a chiropractic procedure has been rec-
ommended for neck pain. Chiropractic has not been
demonstrated to be definitively effective for the treat-
ment of any medical condition, and its ostensible mech-
anisms are not consistent with accepted science (Ernst
2008; Posadzki and Ernst 2011).
Chatwin presents transcripts of consultations in order
to explore the difficulties AM practitioners face when
attempting to explain their reasoning and field patients’
questions and challenges. Unable to rely on the persua-
sive power of conventional explanations or bodies of
evidence, practitioners must pre-emptively buttress their
credibility through careful management of the therapeu-
tic encounter. Practitioners are often compelled to tacti-
cally reinforce the axioms of their therapy early on in the
encounter, which means they can subsequently Butilise
previously prepared and familiar sequences of narrative
in which they are, by default, cast as the figure of
authority^ (Chatwin 2008, 250). This description stands
in stark contrast with the motivations for AM recorded
in section 4, where resisting biomedical authority and
seeking autonomy within participatory care were para-
mount for most patients.
It seems that patients must simply believe in the
proffered AM therapy, because they trust either the
practitioner or the paradigm. Indeed, the efficacy of
AM treatments relies on this trust and may be
undermined by its removal. Yet trust without informed
consent is patently a violation of autonomy and seems to
suggest a reliance upon unchallenged authority within
the AM paradigm, which violates its celebrated virtues
of offering autonomy and control to patients. And whilst
AM may offer non-universal, personalized therapies,
one wonders at the value of these bespoke therapies if
their particularities are not explainable in ways that meet
our usual standards of compatibility with other bodies of
knowledge. While standardized care within SM has its
shortcomings, individualized care in the context of AM
is vulnerable to charges of arbitrariness.
Further, it is not controversial to suggest that
equality and justice in healthcare, as in other spheres
of our social world, require engagement with a com-
mon substrate of meaning. It would be very difficult
to adjudicate charges of racism (say) in AM delivery
if there are no benchmarks against which to measure
standard, acceptable care, or to be able to predict
what a patient might reasonably expect, and why.
Avoiding abusing one’s power requires transparency
Bioethical Inquiry
with others, and that transparency can only be ob-
tained if you are able to justify your choices in such a
way that the patient can verify that they were appro-
priate or elect another person to do so.
Of course, none of this militates against the reality
that many AM patients are very satisfied with their care.
Indeed, most are more satisfied with their AM practi-
tioner than their general practitioner (Finnigan 1991).
Undoubtedly, there is much to admire in the therapeutic
relationships of AM practitioners, who generally spend
longer with patients, hear a more detailed history, and
tend to generate an encounter that is perceived to be
compassionate and collaborative. Of course, almost all
AM is privatized, which liberates practitioners from the
constraints on time and resources that are so common in
public healthcare systems.
In short, AM’s lack of engagement with plausible
mechanisms of action, and ipso facto, with explanations
and informed consent, leads to a situation in which there
is a therapeutic free-for-all in which all manner of (po-
tentially contradictory) claims may be made, and in
which patient autonomy drops off the agenda, leaving
those who aremarginalized by SMwith neither effective
treatment nor meaningful autonomy. Where indepen-
dent verification has no mileage, and trust is so critical,
the potential for abuse is considerable. As AM becomes
progressively more commercialized (Collyer 2017), this
is a grave concern.
SM has done a good deal of damage, but it has also
brought about some of our most unequivocal goods.
Many of its benefits are unfairly distributed, it is some-
times insensitively delivered, and its operation is too
often oblivious to social and political factors, but once
these realities are fully apprehended, they become ques-
tions of practice, not principle, and do not bear on the
potential of the paradigm to bring about positive change.
The trouble with AM seems to runmuch deeper, and it is
therefore a matter of moral urgency for those working
within SM to ensure that patients’ decision to choose
AM therapies is not primarily motivated by disillusion-
ment with medicine, especially as a result of a particular
marginalized identity.
Conclusion
Within this paper I have made the following argu-
ment: SM is patriarchal and under-serves women;
women dominate AM, both as users and service-
providers; women who choose AM often cite dissat-
isfaction with SM and the desire for greater autono-
my and personalization within the clinical encounter.
Based on these premises, it is likely that women use
AM because it promises to offer greater autonomy
and personalization than SM. This segues into a
second argument: autonomy in healthcare requires
informed consent; informed consent is not possible
for AM therapies since mechanisms are either not
known or not plausible, and there is no evidence
base. These premises entail that AM cannot help
patients to realize autonomy. Combining these two
conclusions, it seems that AM does not offer the
control and autonomy that is sought. Whilst it may
be argued that AM offers personalization and a sat-
isfactory therapeutic encounter, it must also be noted
that forfeiting an evidence base, plausible mecha-
nisms, and the ability to make autonomous decisions
is a heavy loss to patients and one for which SM must
take some responsibility.
I have attempted to motivate each of the above pre-
mises in the preceding sections. In this section I reflect
on the implications of these conclusions and make rec-
ommendations to ensure that women’s health needs are
more adequately met.
First, to the extent that rejection of SM may be seen
as a form of resistance, the cost of that resistance is
borne largely by the resistors themselves. Those who
begin with a sense of dissatisfaction with SM—in many
cases stemming from SM’s failure to provide them with
adequate healthcare or to inspire trust in its own
decency—end upwith healthcare that is onmany counts
less adequate.
With the ascendance of a post-factual culture, argu-
ments relying on evidence, reproducibility, and consis-
tency are liable to have ever less traction. By corollary,
the features that have typically worked against AM—its
lack of an evidence base—are likely to pose less of a
barrier to its uptake. This ought to be a grave public
health concern, since the well-being of entire populations
depends onmedicine earning and retaining the trust of all.
To see this, one need only consider how easily herd
immunity is lost when trust in vaccination is undermined,
putting entire populations at risk of disease outbreaks
(Casiday et al. 2006). Recommending against vaccination
is common amongst AM practitioners (especially within
chiropractic, homoeopathy, and naturopathy) whose phi-
losophies so often rely on emphasizing, and in many
cases overstating, iatrogenic risk (Ernst 2001).
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Not much can be done now to atone for medicine’s
history except to openly accept its shortcomings and
undertake particular efforts to re-engage marginal health
populations. While it is easy to suggest that researchers
should be devoting more time to women’s health issues
and their treatments, the bench-to-bedside timeline is
long, and more immediate efforts are also necessary.
As Ernst (2010) has noted, concentrating on the thera-
peutic relationship within SM seems like the most con-
structive way forward. Although patients often look to
SM for the Bscience of medicine,^ clearly many are
turning to AM for the Bart of medicine^ (Ernst 2010,
1473)—for a compassionate clinical encounter in which
patients are humanized and power differentials are flat-
tened. While SM may have the upper hand in terms of
mechanisms, an evidence base, and social capital, there
are inadequacies in the patient–practitioner relationship,
and in this respect there is much to learn from AM
modalities, where the therapeutic relationship is key to
their appeal. Even the most resolute AM user inevitably
encounters SM professionals on occasion. Provided
broader pressures on health workers permit them the
time and space, those encounters present the possibility
of demonstrating that SM can be person-centred, equi-
table, and sensitive to the differential needs of margin-
alized patient groups.
As I described in section 4, many of those who
choose AM do so following a long period of unsatisfac-
tory encounters with medical professionals as they pur-
sue the treatment or resolution of long-term chronic
ailments (Furnham and Vincent 2000; Cant and
Sharma 2004). The majority of these patients are wom-
en. While AM practitioners are unlikely to offer thera-
pies that are effective beyond placebo, they are able to
offer consultations which are longer, more participatory,
and more personalized. It is likely that most of the
placebo effect is interpersonal and stems from the ritual
of healing within encounters with practitioners, rather
than from any specific therapy (Miller et al. 2009).
There is some evidence that open label placebos still
confer a placebo effect, which suggests that the thera-
peutic relationship plays a significant role (Kaptchuk
et al. 2010). In light of these insights, Blease (2012)
suggests that the placebo effect instead be referred to as
the Bpositive care effect.^ Given the importance of
communication and autonomy amongst patients choos-
ing AM, it is interesting to note that a surgical study
shows that the extent of the positive care effect is con-
tingent on the quality of the clinical encounter, with
communication skills aimed at empowering patients
being predictive of better clinical outcomes (Trummer
et al. 2006).
Focusing on the U.K. healthcare system, I therefore
recommend that general practitioners, who are the gate-
keepers of the medical profession, make efforts to ad-
dress the inadequacies in the clinical encounter, specif-
ically for those with long-term health conditions or
medically unexplained symptoms. As it stands, general
practitioners in the United Kingdom spend ten minutes
with each patient and are encouraged to focus on a
single health issue. It is therefore unsurprising to note
that dissatisfaction with the clinical encounter is shared
by clinicians. In a recent survey, 55 per cent of general
practice surgeries in the United Kingdom reported con-
cerns about the quality of care they could provide and
described their workload as unmanageable most of the
time; 13 per cent reported that it was unmanageable all
of the time (Iacobucci 2016). In another study, 68 per
cent of general practitioners expressed the view that care
could be improved by longer, higher-quality consulta-
tions, while 67 per cent felt that patients with long-term
conditions should be afforded longer consultations
(Rimmer 2015). It has been demonstrated that longer
consultation times correlate with a greater likelihood of
taking a thorough medical history and conducting ex-
aminations in accordance with good practice, a lower
prescribing rate, a greater likelihood of offering advice
about preventative healthcare, and fewer follow-up con-
sultations (Wilson and Childs 2002).
General practitioners are currently able to make re-
ferrals to specialists in various clinical disciplines. In
addition to lengthening standard consultation times, the
option of making general referrals may be a constructive
way forward, i.e. arranging for the patient to have a
lengthier consultation with a general practitioner rather
than being siloed into a specialist referral (which is
liable to be an even less holistic encounter) or sent away.
Given the importance of the therapeutic encounter, it is
also worth considering increasing the number of talking
therapies referrals for long-term physical health prob-
lems. As it stands, talking therapies are recommended
within the U.K. National Health Service for a range of
social, mental, and physical conditions. This could be
broadened, so that those whose physical symptoms are
not being satisfactorily resolved within the biomedical
paradigm are able to benefit from a personalized thera-
peutic relationship which does not rely on implausible
mechanisms (NHS Choices 2016).
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That women may be less likely to benefit from med-
icine and therefore more likely to spend time and money
seeking therapies whose claims are questionable, whose
benefits are negligible, and whose potential for exploi-
tation is considerable, is a grave matter. Researchers and
clinicians must take responsibility by consciously mod-
ernizing biomedicine to ensure that its goods are acces-
sible to all and that the benefits of a positive therapeutic
encounter are acknowledged and prioritized in the de-
livery of care.
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